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WHEN PUSH COMES TO SHOVE:
MANDATORY IMMUNIZATION IN TIMES OF
PANDEMIC-TYPE EMERGENCIES
PHILIP P. HOULE & SUZANNE R. HOULE'
Upon the principle of self-defense, or paramount necessity,
a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic or
disease which threatens the safety of its members ....
If the mode adopted by... Massachusetts for the protection
of its local communities against smallpox proved to be distressing,
inconvenient, or objectionable to some.., the answer is that it was
the duty of the constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the
welfare, comfort, and safety of the many, and not permit the
interests of the many to be subordinated to the wishes or
convenience of the few. There is, of course, a sphere within which
the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will .... But it
is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the
duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the
individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure
of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand.'
This paper will explore when the government can mandate
vaccination and other methods of treatment to control contagious
disease and epidemics, and related legal and practical issues such
as time and other limits on emergency powers, "drafting"
physicians and health workers to assist, and the scope of judicial
review and remedies.
' Philip Houle graduated from Marist College, holds law degrees from the
University of Maine and University of Missouri-Kansas City, is a member of the
Maine, Missouri, Tennessee, and Maryland Bars, and works in Washington,
D.C. The views expressed herein are solely his own.
- Suzanne R. Houle graduated from the University of Maryland at College Park
with honors in psychology and environmental science and from the University
of North Carolina law school. She is a member of the Maryland bar.
I Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27-29 (1905) (rejecting claim by

persons with no signs of disease for exemption from mandatory vaccination on
religious grounds).
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The problem is not limited to natural causes. As thenSecretary of Defense William S. Cohen noted, we are in a "grave
new world" in which a number of nations, including Iraq, Iran,
China, Taiwan, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, Cuba, Israel, Russia,
Japan, and the United States likely have biological weapons
programs. 2
Dealing with pandemics is global in scope. "Anthrax
doesn't respect state borders .... Whatever public health emer-

gency we experience in Washington is likely to be a' 3problem in
Oregon and Idaho and, for that matter, Canada as well. ,
Health pandemics, natural or the product of humans, are
often global in one aspect or another.4 What happens in, say, South
America
or Eastern Europe will probably impact the United
5
States.
The current global recession almost certainly impacts
public health. When times are tough, the two things that
surface
6
mix.
the
in
consequences
health
with
are crime and war,

2

William S. Cohen, Preparingfor a Grave New World, WASHINGTON POST at

A19 (July 26, 1999).
3 Ken Wing, Policy Choices and Model Acts: Preparingfor the Next Public
Health Emergency, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 71, 82 (2003). See also Alfred
DeMaria, Jr., The Globalizationof Infectious Diseases, 11 NEW ENG. J. INT'L &
COMP. LAW 37 (Fall 2004), and William E Scheuerman, Comment, Time to
Look Abroad? The Legal Regulation of Emergency Powers, 40 GA. L. REV.863
(Spring 2006).
4 Population Response to the Risk of Vector-Borne Diseases: Lessons Learned
from Socio-Behavioural Research During Large-Scale Outbreaks, EMERGING
HEALTH THREATS JOURNAL (2009), http://www.eht-journal.net/index.php/

ehtj/article/view/7083.
' Clayton L. Thomason, It's a Small World After All: Global Health and the
EthicalLessons of SARS, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L. L. 313 (2004). See alsoNational
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (declaration of national emergencies),
implemented by Exec. Order 13,235, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,343 (Nov. 16, 2001)
(developments outside the United States may be considered).
6 A. G. Robertson, The Health Consequences of Economic Crises, EMERGING
HEALTH
THREATS
JOURNAL
(2009),
http://www.eht-journal.net/
index.php/ehtj/article/view/7081.
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Health care and disease-control in developing and Third
World nations is precarious and likely to decline further, as
government and international aid diminishes. 7 Worldwide, the
political and social impact of the financial crisis is being felt as
unemployment rises and income deteriorates, to the point that
public protests are occurring and extremism and terrorism are
increasing. 8 Life-expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa has dropped
from 67 years to 47 years due to AIDS, with a9 rise in child
mortality, including 70% due to AIDS in Zimbabwe.
Complicating the use of vaccination to combat infection is
the fact that vaccine must be developed and administered
significantly in advance of an outbreak actually striking to have a
real effect. Thus, an executive's declaration of an emergency
mandating vaccination sufficiently before a scourge hits will
almost of necessity involve "predictive judgment calls" and
subjective evaluations.' 0
I.

WHAT IS A PANDEMIC AND WHEN DOES
ONE START?

Many of the legal and practical issues on preparing for and
declaring a public health emergency hinge on defining "pandemic"
and determining when one starts.
Pandemics involve person-to-person non-sexual transmission capable of crossing international borders.'1
According to WHO, "[a] pandemic is not a single point in
time, but a scenario that may occur in several waves over a period
7

1d.

9 J. M. Spectar, The Old Order Crumbleth: HIV-Pestilence as a Security Issue
and New Thinking About Core Concepts in InternationalAffairs, 13

IND. INT'L

& COMP. L. REV. 481, 485 (2003).
10 Pandemic Vaccines: Balancing Delays and Protection, EMERGING HEALTH
THREATS JOURNAL, http://www.eht-journal.net/index.php/ehtj/issue/view/526.

11 Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response: Current WHO phase of

pandemic alert,

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

(2009), http://www.who.int/

influenza/preparedness/pandemic/h5nlphase/en/index.html

phases of World Health Organization alerts).

(describing

the 6
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of months" that are difficult or subjective for officials to
identify.
12
Pandemics can appear to halt or dissipate, then continue.
Health experts reportedly were "almost completely
surprised" at how the swine flu unfolded in 2009, to the point that
health experts are now rethinking how to define a pandemic and
what pandemic preparedness might really mean. For now, health
officials will likely be less inclined to move to "stage 6," the top
level of WHO's international pandemic ladder, in which
a
13
pandemic is declared and nations move to control the situation.
Many nations do not have meaningful plans on dealing
with a Phase 6 situation. Therefore, health officials may be forced
to learn "on the run" and issue orders in a fluid, fast-changing
situation. If so, that would have novel or unclear implications for
both public-health and legal issues. 14
II.

CHAMBER OF BIOLOGICAL HORRORS "DESIGNER PLAGUES"

As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted, we
are truly in a "grave new world" in which bio-terrorists and others
can intentionally or otherwise wreak havoc on the world by
creating "designer plagues" that end-run known medical
15
defenses.
12 See

When does a pandemic start? Industrial engineers take a closer look at

planningstages as the WHO re-works alertscale, EMERGING HEALTH THREATS
FORUM,
http://anitamakri.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/EHTF09.05.28_

anitamakri.com .pdf

13 David Brown New Virus Spurs Experts to Rethink Definition of Pandemic,

POST,
May 31, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/05/30/AR2009053001766pf.html.
14Kapil Kumar Bhanot, What Defines a PublicHealth Emergency? An Analysis
of the Strategic NationalStockpile and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act: The Needfor Prevention ofNonterrorNationalMedical Emergencies,21 J.
WASHINGTON

& POL'Y 137, 145-53 (Winter 2004) (noting judicial
deference to health agencies).
CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW

15See David A. Koplow, That Wonderful Year: Smallpox, Genetic Engineering,
and Bio-terrorism, 62 MD. L. REV. 417, 466 (2003); George W. Christopher et
al., BiologicalWarfare:A HistoricalPerspective,278 JAMA 412 (1997).
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"[T]he potential use of biological agent to inflict disease is
a pernicious consequence of advances in medical, laboratory, and
engineering sciences. This threat cannot be dismissed, given the
extensive biologic-weapons programs in Iraq and the former Soviet
Union, and the terrorism targeted at Americans abroad,
as well as
'1 6
Americans."
by
perpetrated
terrorism
acts of domestic
The chamber of biological horrors-natural
and
7
ferocity.'
and
size
in
increasing
seemingly
otherwise-is
Even without the "help" of state-sponsored or free-lance
terrorists, the biotic world may be mutating in that direction on its
own. 18

A list of potential bio-horrors could probably continue for
pages. Many of the new risks, though, are likely unknown to the
public and even health professionals, as terrorists and their allies
develop designer plagues and as natural diseases develop along
those lines circumventing our best defenses.
The chamber of bio19
recycling.
and
expanding
both
is
horrors

16 A.S.

Khan & D.A. Ashford, Ready or Not - Preparednessfor Bioterrorism,

345 NEW ENGLAND J.
17 A

MED.

287 (2001).

bibliography of works on human-made designer plagues and the like is
found at Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense
University, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: The
Threat According to the Current Unclassified Literature (May 31, 2002),
http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/CBRN
Annotated Bib.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2012); see also Testimony of John
Parachini before U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on National
Security, Combating Terrorism: Assessing the Threat of Biological Terrorism,
Rand Corporation (Oct. 12, 2001), www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/CT
183.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
18 ELINOR LEVY & MARK FISCHETTI, THE NEW KILLER DISEASES: HOW THE
ALARMING EVOLUTION OF MUTANT GERMS THREATENS US ALL (Crown Pub.

2003).
19David Brown, Swine flu wanes, but experts say pandemic strain could
reemerge, THE WASHINGTON POST, p. HE01 (Feb. 23, 2010), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/22/AR2010022203
638 pf.html (last visited October 19, 2011).
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HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS HOW HAVE THEY BEEN USED OR
ABUSED?

A. Historical Overview
In the context of the war on terrorism, Professor David
Cole of Georgetown University has written on the history of
emergency powers in the United States and elsewhere, and has
concluded that there is considerable reason to doubt that the laws
on the books would not be abused. Professor Cole notes the
tendency in times of emergency to give short-shrift to civil liberties
that shield minorities and unpopular groups from heated and
fearful over-reactions without proof of an individualized showing
of risk.2°
For legislatures and executives, "[i]t is much easier to sell
an initiative that denies only the rights of [unpopular minorities or
21
persons] than one that requires everyone to sacrifice their rights."
Further, executives are quick to declare emergencies and are often
very slow to declare the emergency over and give up those powers,
sometimes keeping the emergency powers in place for many years
or even decades after the true emergency had ended.22
While more is said on judicial review later, recent history
has shown the dangers resulting from lack of timely and
meaningful action by the courts. Facing the often-stated argument
that executives have greater access to intelligence and similar
information and thus warrant special judicial deference, Professor
Cole asks: if "the executive has much greater power to classified
intelligence and foreign policy expertise in ordinary times as well
20

David Cole, No Reason to Believe: Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power,

and ConstitutionalRestraint,75 U. CHI. L. REv. 1329, 1355 (Summer 2008). "In
a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and
oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature
where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger."
Federalist51 (Madison in The Federalist347, 352 (Wesleyan 1961)) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed.).
21 Id. at 1350.
22
Id. at 1353-54.
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[as emergencies],... why should their
23 argument for [expansive]
deference be limited to emergencies?
And, of course, officials' waiving the "emergency flag"
before a court and the public can be viewed as a means of
stampeding or short-circuiting the analytical process and public
debate.24
Yet the ongoing debate as to the outer limits of government
power in major emergencies is still unresolved. But it does appear
that if a truly major disaster were at hand (or even fairly clearly
foreseeable), the government's powers to act would be great.25
Even if the dust had settled on an emergency, when faced
with money damages claims for wrongful detention against
depleted government treasuries, courts might be reluctant to find
liability for fear of making the situation worse for government
agencies forced to divert resources from other public needs. Such
an outcome could result despite laws like N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14882 to 148-84, which authorize payments from the government of
$20,000 to 500,000 per year for wrongful detention
or
26
detention.
wrongful
constructive
possibly
and
incarceration
The last major pandemic to strike America was the Spanish
Influenza of 1918. While American concepts of due-process have
23

Id. at 1355.

24 CASS

R.

SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

40 (2005) ("the word 'terrorism' evokes vivid images of disaster, thus crowding
out probability judgments" by judges and others).
25 Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029 (March
2004) ("[t]errorist attacks will be [a permanent] part of our future" and diminish
liberty); & Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far
Are Limitations on Personaland Economic LibertiesJustified?, 55 FLA. L. REV.
1105, 1106 (2003).
26 See Ackerman, supra note 25, at 1063 n.82 (listing federal and State
laws on

compensation for wrongful detention). A civil suit by a private citizen against
the government for an injunction or declaratory judgment that the act of the
executive exceeded his or her authority under a statute or was unconstitutional
could be converted into a monetary damages claim if a court ruled in a citizen's
favor and established grounds for damages, particularly if the government did
not honor a court's declaratory judgment; see SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical
Secs., 574 F.2d 90, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1978) (collateral estoppel effect of SEC action

in later suit against wrongdoer by private victim).
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expanded since then, potential "Dark Winter"-like fears are 27a
reminder that we likely have not yet heard the last word on this.
Thus, it may be the case that we are in a new, undeclared era
involving a perpetual state of emergency.
But others say that any supposed "new era" of civil rights
has long been part of our American constitutional method
of
28
dealing with wars and major emergencies, for better or worse.
Despite the ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacobson
v. Massachusetts,29 modern medical and isolation methods and
protections would likely be asserted as grounds for not mandating
vaccination of those 30who oppose it on moral, religious, or
philosophical grounds.
In sum, the history of emergencies seems to be one of the
lack of adequate preparation and being forced (hopefully) to learn
on the run. 3 1 Another theme is that "[lt]he history of public health is
littered with illustrations of trade-offs between public health and
32
civil liberties."

27

Mark Hitchcock, Government Rights to Quarantine:An Examination Under

the Modern Notion of Due Process (May 28, 2007) (University of California
Boalt Hall School of Law), http://www.pdfio.com/k-56081.html.
28 Symposium: A New Constitutional Order? Panel II: The Emergency
Constitution in the Post-September 11 World Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 471,
471 (Nov. 2006); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE
CONSTITUTION TN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) (recognizing a role

for
judicial review here).
29
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,27-29.
30 Re'em Segev, MoralJustification,Administrative Power and Emergencies, 53
L. REV. 629, 643-45 (2005-06); Barbara Loe Fisher, The Moral Right
to Conscientious, Personal Belief or PhilosophicalExemption to Mandatory
CLEV. ST.

Vaccination Laws,

NAT'L VACCINE INFO. CTR.

(May 2, 1997, 12:00:00 AM),

http://www.nvic.org/informed-consent.aspx (last visited May 18, 2009).
31 See, e.g., Hillary R. Ahle, Anticipating PandemicAvian Influenza: Why
the

Federal and State PlansAre for the Birds, 10

DEPAUL

J. HEALTH

CARE

L. 213,

217-18 (2006-07) (explaining the Federal government's lack of emergency
preparedness and its subsequent response).
32 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Law In An Age Of Terrorism: Rethinking
Individual Rights and Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 79. 88 (2002),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/21/6/79.
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B. Justice Holmes on Emergency Law
Justice Holmes is perhaps regarded as the father of modem
law on emergencies, which forms the backdrop of mandatory
public health measures in times of emergency. Justice Holmes took
the position that:
1. The existence and duration of an emergency are questions
of fact.
2. During emergencies, courts should not practice 'judicial
minimalism" but should reach out promptly to declare the
existence of an emergency, limits on governmental power,
and the end of an emergency.
3. During emergencies, there are no non-derogable rights,
since government can do virtually anything if circumstances warrant, including the taking of human life.
4. The main checks on government action during emergencies
are
a. Legislative limitations on executive powers.
b. Ex post sunsetting once an emergency has actually
ended by rescinding government's emergency
powers.
5. In the eyes of the law, there is no distinction between
33
different types of emergencies.
Ambiguity in laws or court rulings can create
aggressiveness in officials, who may well respond by moving to
"seize disputed legal territory" and thereby diminish the prospects
for meaningful full future judicial
review and subject citizens to
34
unlawful action in the meantime.
33 Adrian Vermeule, Holmes on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 164, 171
(2008). See also Cass R. Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C.
Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 694 (2005) ("In the aftermath of

September 11, minimalists courts proceed in small steps, leaving the largest
issues undecided as long as possible"). See Generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Minimalism at War, 2004 S. CT. REV. 47 (2004) (explaining the role of
minimalism in judicial decisions).
14 Vermeule, supra, note 33, at 180.
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Justice Holmes' view of emergencies as "fact" greatly
affects the availability and the scope of judicial review.
Legislatures are typically the best or most competent agency on
facts, and courts on the law.3 5 Holmes would defer to the
legislature and executive that an emergency exists, but not as to
obvious mistakes or clear errors as to either the facts or the law.
In contrast to the "perpetual state of emergency" we are
said to be in today, Holmes assumed that emergencies were only
temporary and that it 3was
wrong to assume that an emergency
6
forever.
continue
would
As to the imminence of harm needed to constitute an
emergency, Holmes believed that harm must be immediate or that
an immediate intent to bring it about existed 7 Imminence was a
question of proximity and degree.3 8 Presumably Justice Holmes
would modify that position to account for developments in
technology and the need for fairly lengthy periods of "lead time" to
plan and act, although case law seems not to have fully addressed
that.
The Supreme Court's statements on how emergencies
impact the law are arguably unclear or conflicting. In upholding a
law establishing an 8-hour work-day for railroad workers to avoid
labor unrest as America entered World War I, the Court stated that
"although an emergency may not call into life a power which has
never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the
39
exertion of a living power already enjoyed.
However, reliance on government's potent "inherent
powers," would seem in theory to avoid claims that it had created

35

Id. at 168-71.

36 Id. at 173 (citing RCHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS:

INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 at 187-89 (2005)).

3Id. at 174.
381d. at 174-75.
39 Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917). But in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 285 U.S. 495, 528 (1935), the Court stated that:
"[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power"
(emphasis added.)
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new powers
from whole cloth powers that did not previously
0
exist.

4

"[T]he President has implied constitutional power under
Article II of the Constitution to suspend entry of certain groups of
aliens ....

Even if there is no express statute for the President to

execute, he may act to protect threatened American citizens or
property. 4 1 Thus the President clearly has inherent authority to act
to protect the United States ....
The fact that the government's or executive's inherent or
express authority has not been exercised in the past or has
long
43
been dormant has been held not to invalidate that authority.
Individuals who assert "surprise" or a lack of fundamental
unfairness that a court's announcing or recognizing for the first
time (or for the first time in many years) a specific inherent power
of government would likely have to overcome case-law giving the
executive exceptionally broad powers in times of emergency and
otherwise refusing to apply laches to government. When it comes
to inherent power, a court could reason that the inherent power
claimed by the executive is sufficiently central to the carrying out
of executive powers as to be readily implied and understood as a

40

See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct.. Rev. 2002) (recognizing

"that the President did have inherent authority to conduct warrantless searches to
obtain foreign intelligence information"); Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40
So.2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1949) ("Inherent power .... .[u]nder
our form of
government [is] the right that each department of government has to execute the
powers falling naturally within its orbit[.]").
41 Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (D.D.C. 1985)
(citation omitted).
42 Id.; see also Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative
Perspective, 115 YALE L. J. 2480, 2495-2503 (2006) (discussing inherent
executive power and emergences).
43 United States v. Lane-Labs USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 226 (3d Cir. 2005)
("'[a]uthority granted by Congress . . . cannot evaporate through lack of
administrative exercise') (citing Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S.
122, 131 (1983)). See also Luoyang Bearing Factory v. United States, 240 F.
Supp. 2d 1268, 1283 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002) (noting that "an agency must be
allowed to reassess the wisdom of its policy on an ongoing basis .... [A]gency
discretion to reconsider policies is inalienable").
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matter of basic fairness, as discussed in the above cases and in the
following section on probable cause.
C. A Recent Analysis of American Emergency
Law
An interesting and realistic view of the American law of
emergencies was recently presented in Comment, Small
Emergencies:
America has not in general had a toggle-switch approach to
crises, where normal constitutionalism continues until a
switch is flipped to stop it, and then the emergency
continues until the switch is flipped back .... [Thus] [t]he
more realistic view is that emergencies are endemic to the
American constitutional order, which has absorbed and
rationalized them within the system of public law rather
than holding them outside normal governance. In many
ways, this is consistent with . . . [the] argument, which
warns darkly of the "permanent emergency." The 'great
presidents,' Lincoln and Roosevelt, played fast and loose
with constitutional rules in the name of civil war and
economic emergency. Beyond these extreme cases,
emergency exceptionalism . . . has always had its
defenders. Venerable (and some unlikely) figures like
George Mason, James Madison, Charles Evans Hughes,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, have been caught saying kind
things about exceptional governance in Levinson's account.
To his impressive list, we add Thomas Jefferson, who
wrote: There are extreme cases where the laws become
inadequate even to their own preservation, and where the
universal recourse is a dictator, or martial law.... On great
occasions every good officer must be ready to risk himself
in going beyond the strict lines of law, where the public
preservation requires it .... [But] in America and virtually
every other stable democratic constitutional state, the
government retreatsfrom the extremes when the declared
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crisis ends. That is what it means to have an ongoing
constitutionalorder .... 44
But what might come of America's traditional "retreat from the
extremes" of the law when we live in an apparent age of
"permanent emergency," due to international dangers and
terrorism? That question is still unanswered. But as a friend said:
"One mushroom cloud over Denver, and the Bill of Rights will be
'suspended' indefinitely until further notice, on the demand of the
people."
Under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of
1974 (Stafford Act), the President may determine the existence of
an emergency, defined as: any occasion or instance for which
federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts
and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and the public
health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe
in any part of the United States.45 That grant of power apparently
is absolute.4 6 There are no additional guidelines in the Stafford Act
as what constitutes an emergency.47
Further, procedural rules established by other statutes for
administering federal funds may be overridden in a presidentiallydeclared emergency. 48 The Stafford Act also authorizes the
President to suspend or override laws in dealing with a crisis. 49
While Michael Greenberger's scenario discussed in the
following section envisions action by local and State officials, the
"emergency exception" to the Posse Comitatus Act allows the
President to use federal troops for local law-enforcement during
national emergencies. 50 Additional authorities that allow the
44 Id. at 843 (emphasis added.) For the proposition that America has generally

not had a toggle-switch approach to crises, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Comment,
Small
Emergencies, 40 GA. L. REV. 835, 843 (2005-2006)
45
1 d. at 842.
46
[d.at 843.
47 Id.
48

id.

49 id.
50 JENNIFER

K.

ELSEA

& R.

CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,

RS22266,

THE USE OF FEDERAL TROOPS FOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE: LEGAL ISSUES
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military to perform local law-enforcement include the Insurrection
Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378, 18 U.S.C. § 831 (nuclear and
radiological risks), the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C., 51Ch. 68, and executive nonstatutory "inherent emergency power."
IV.

SCENARIO OF CONCERN TO THE LEGAL
COMMUNITY

A scenario of concern for the legal community in
connection with massive health emergencies would involve
mandatory vaccinations, physical exams, and quarantines due to
public health threats. Some view emergency power as eroding civil
liberties, with52 the ongoing "war on terrorism" only heightening
that concern.
Michael Greenberger, Director of the University of
Maryland's Center for Health and Homeland Security, projects a
likely scenario that we would face if and when a bio-terrorist strike
occurred.53
Private citizens would be stopped by police, following the
governor's declaration of catastrophic health emergency in the
hypothetical wake of a crop-duster spreading a smallpox pathogen
over large parts of a city. The smallpox would be highly
contagious with a 30 percent mortality rate. The governor would
have authorized authorities to compel persons in affected areas to
(2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22266 20081128.pdf. The

President could also "federalize" State officials and the unorganized militia, and
the Coast Guard could be pressed into service since it is exempt from Posse
Comitatus under 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2000). Jason Mazzone, The Commander in
Chief 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 265, 274-80, 289, 303-10 (2007). The military

may always provide "indirect" local law enforcement assistance under 10 U.S.C.
§ 375 (2000). Id.at 289.
l Id. at 2-5.
52 Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L. J.

1385, 1412-21 (1989) (federal laws that limited the President's power during
emergencies had little impact in real life).

51 Michael Greenberger, America at War - The Legal Issues: The Law of
Counterrorism Wants You!, 35 MD. B. J. 10, 15 at n. al (Nov./Dec. 2002).
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be immediately examined for signs of contamination and
vaccinated against smallpox as a precaution, pursuant to the State's
catastrophic health emergencies
law that purport to justify the
54
actions taken by the State.
Police would then direct citizens to nearby tents to disrobe
before a police officer and medical person for an examination and
vaccinations. Citizens would then be warned that about one out of
1 million persons vaccinated die and that many more suffer nonlethal, but severe, reaction. Those citizens who inquire as to the
consequences of not submitting to the process would be informed
that they will be taken to a holding facility with others who
refuse,
55
misdemeanor.
criminal
a
with
charged
be
likely
and will
Citizens are also told that following the examination and
vaccination, they will be quarantined in a nearby school building
for as long as it would take to determine that they pose no
substantial risk of transmitting smallpox, a process that could take
up to thirty days-and that every effort will be made by public
officials to bring adequate food and supplies to quarantine
centers. 56 Family members of detainees will be subject to the same
procedures and restrictions and maintained in quarantine centers
near the location where they were confronted by police, often
considerable distances and incommunicado.
Judicial review, while available, might very well be
delayed considerably, due to the nature of the emergency and the
sheer volume of hearings. Lawyers and judges themselves would
also be subject to the same vaccination and quarantine rules and a
shortage of available lawyers and judges could arise.58

54

55
56
57
58

[d. at

12-13.

Id. at 12.
id.
id.

[d.
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PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE
SUSPICION IN TIMES OF EMERGENCIES

On the heels of legal concerns over massive police-sweeps
of citizens for mandatory vaccination and possible quarantining,
come issues of probable cause, search-and-seizure and the
authority of government to take action against individuals when
there is no proof that they were infected or dangerous.
A. Balancing Test
The Supreme Court has stated that "determination of the
standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of
searches requires 'balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the
intrusion ...

against the importance
of the governmental interests
59

alleged to justify the intrusion.
Some courts have held that quarantining and isolation
require something beyond
mere suspicion to believe that a person
60
has a contagious disease.

B. Exemptions to Fourth Amendment Emergency Authorities
The "emergency authorities," "community caretaking" and
"special needs" exceptions to the Fourth Amendment have been

O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987). See also Camara v. Mun.
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (referencing warrantless
housing inspections); John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police
59

Responses, andFourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

433,451 (1999).
60 See Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.App.3d 736, 740 (1990) ; see also
Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 432, (1922) ("A person cannot be
quarantined upon mere suspicion that he may have a contagious and infectious
disease"). See also Love at 742 (1990) ( upholding mandatory immunization for
prostitution-related AIDS, California noted that government action which might
otherwise be unconstitutional is often valid under "the 'special needs'
doctrine."); Hill v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 442, 455-57, (finding that
"inspections ...

without a warrant" are "traditionally upheld in emergenc[ies]")

(citing U.S. Supreme Court).
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held to allow government action to proceed without
a warrant or
61
probable cause when exigent circumstances exist.
The "emergency authorities" exception allows for
infringement on the privacy rights of persons who may be innocent
but are swept up in a police net during an emergency. In these
situations, law enforcement officials may take intrusive measures
against a much broader number of persons, such as when the police
have a partial description of a suspected
terrorist and stop everyone
62
who matches that partial description.
This can, of course, lead to racial or ethnic profiling and
underscores an as-yet unresolved tension between the requirement
of individualized suspicion on an anti-discriminatory basis versus
the government's practical63 inability to effectively address a
significant threat otherwise.
C. Special Needs
Government action that would otherwise be uncon64

stitutional is often upheld under "the 'special needs' doctrine."
The "special needs" exception will also justify a search
without probable cause or a warrant. 65 In Vernonia, the Court
added that: "[a] search unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional... 'when special
needs.., make... probable-cause
66
impracticable."'
requirements
61 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (exigent circumstances

justified temporary seizure without warrant); see also Warden, Md. Penitentiary
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (warrantless search of penitentiary
inmates for weapons upheld when exigent circumstances existed).
62 See generally Thomas K, Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in
Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV.
483 (1994).
63 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Tuberculosis and the Power of the State: Toward the
Development of RationalStandardsfor the Review of Compulsory Public Health
Powers, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 219, 257-59 (1995).
64 Love at 742, (discussing mandatory vaccination for prostitution-related AIDS)
(citing U.S. Supreme Court). See also Hill at 455-57 (concerning warrantless
inspections in emergencies) (citing U.S. Supreme Court).
65 Vernonia Sch. Dist 47 J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) & Nat'l Treas.
Empl. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-56 (1989).
66
[d. at 653.
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Special needs considers: (1) "the nature of privacy"
violated, (2) "the character of the intrusion," and (3) "the nature
and immediacy of the government's
concern ... and the efficacy
67
of [the search] for meeting it.'
Courts often use the special-needs exception when the
government acts in civil or regulatory matters. 68 But agencies are
not prohibited from turning over evidence to criminal 69
prosecutors,
nature.
in
civil
was
inquiry
government
when an initial

D. Community Caretaking
The "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth
Amendment is based on the concept that the police strive to ensure
the safety and welfare of the community at large and that some
emergencies require immediate action. When no seizure of a
person is involved, an officer is not required to have particularized
objective justification.7 °
These types of civil/administrative or non-criminal policecitizen encounters are not judged by the normal Fourth
Amendment 7standards
since they are not deemed to be searches
1
and seizures.

67

Id. at 654, 658 & 660 (finding that student-athlete drug tests results used only

for sports eligibility). See also Von Raab at 663 (no criminal prosecution);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989) (safety
drug-tests not sought for criminal prosecution).
68 See Vernonia at 653-54. Some commentators claim that the special-needs
exception could swallow whole the Fourth Amendment. See generally Jennifer
Y. Buffaloe, Note, "SpecialNeeds" and the FourthAmendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant PreferenceRule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
529 (1997); Michael Polloway, Comment, Does the FourthAmendment Prohibit
Suspicionless Searches or Do Individual Rights Succumb to the Government's

"So-Called"Special Needs?, 10 SEToN HALL CONST. L. J. 143 (1999).
69 See United States v. Fort, 248 F.3d 475, 478-80 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding the
denial of a motion to suppress 561 pounds of marijuana discovered as the result
of a routine commercial inspection.)
70 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973). See also Mary E. Naumann,
The Community CaretakerDoctrine: Yet Another FourthAmendment Exception,
26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325 (1999).
71See Cady, 413 U.S. at 442-43; Naumann, supra note 71.
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Courts use a three-part test to evaluate communitycaretaking: (1) "there must exist an objectively reasonable basis for
a belief in an immediate need for police assistance for the
protection of life or substantial property interests," (2) the police
action "must be motivated by an intent to aid" rather than solve a
crime, and (3) the police action "must fall within the scope of the
emergency. 72 Bioterrorism, for example, presents a unique
challenge under the Fourth Amendment, one that the courts have
not resolved, in that it presents a low-probability but highmagnitude risk.
E. Administrative and Regulatory Inspections
Even in non-emergency, garden-variety civil administrative
inspections like those by regulatory and health agencies, courts
have recognized that agency officials may investigate "merely on
suspicion" or just because they "[want] assurance" that a situation
does not warrant further action.73
As the courts address the above Fourth Amendment
exceptions in terrorism cases, answers should emerge as to: (1) the
scope of discretion that police have as the magnitude and
proximity of risks vary, (2) the rules of engagement that govern
and distinguish valid security concerns from pretexts for arbitrary
police action, (3) when, if ever, targets may validly become the
focus of police attention on the basis of their race or ethnicity,
(4) when probable cause or reasonable suspicion are needed, and
(5) the extent of police intrusions into private homes and
businesses without probable cause.

72

Decker, supra note 60, at 457, 510, 517.
73United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950); McVane v.
FDIC, 44 F.3d 1127, 1134-35 (2d Cir. 1995) (distinguishing agency subpoenas
from criminal warrants); United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.

2007) (en banc) (noting that a private business subject to agency regulation has
little-to-no expectation of privacy).
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POST 9-11 ACTION AND THE MODEL
STATE HEALTH EMERGENCY POWERS
ACT

A. Background
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention commissioned Johns Hopkins University
to convene experts and draft a Model State Health Emergency
Powers Act. Over 44 States (including North Carolina 74) have
adopted some or all of the Model Act. The legislation and
executive orders issued in the aftermath 75
of 9-11 underscored the
Act.
Model
the
for
need
medical
and
legal
The Model Act gives governors broad powers to declare
emergencies, including mandatory quarantines and vaccinations of
large segments of the population. The first draft was viewed as an
unjustified departure from traditional patients' rights. In December
2001, the CDC issued a revised draft that tried to address those
concerns.76 Maryland, has reportedly improved on the Model Act.77
In addition, Congress' enactment of the far-reaching Public
Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 247d-7b, went nearly unnoticed. That law covers environmental,
food and drug, agricultural, and intellectual property law, and
allows the President to suspend other laws.78
74 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-71 et

seq. See also

CONTROL

OF NORTH

&

PUBLIC

SAFETY,

STATE

N.C. DEP'T OF CRIME
EMERGENCY

CAROLINA

OPERATIONS PLAN (2009).
75 Some physicians have expressed concern about the model act and have urged

improving public health laws. See Robert M. Pestronk et al., Improving Laws
and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness,36 J.
LAW MED. ETHIcs 47, 48 (Spring 2008).
76 THE CENTER FOR LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, THE MODEL STATE
EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT

(2001), available at www.publichealthlaw.

net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
77 Franklin H. Alden, Jr., Liberty or Death:MarylandImproves Upon the Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act, 8 J. HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY 185

(2005).

7' Greenberger, supra note 54, at 12. See also Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176

(1922) (upholding law vesting "broad discretion" in health officials to apply and

enforce law).
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The Model Act has its defenders. 7 9 According to Professor
Gostin, the Model Act: (A) allows a governor to declare an
emergency only under strict standards and after careful
consultation with public health experts, (B) empowers the
legislature to overrule a governor's emergency declaration at any
time and (C) authorizes the courts to terminate the governor's
declaration if
the governor violates the law or acts uncon80
stitutionally.
Others argue that the Model Act's treatment of civil rights
is still inadequate. 8' The Model Act, though, may be the best
currently available piece of legislation on the books.
B. Overview of Model Act
The Model Act is structured to reflect 5 basic public health
functions to be facilitated by law:
(1) preparedness,including comprehensive planning for a
public health emergency;
(2) surveillance, including measures to detect and track
public health emergencies;
(3) managementofproperty, ensuring adequate availability
of vaccines, pharmaceuticals, and hospitals, as well as
providing power to abate hazards to the public's health;
See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How
FarAre Limitations on Personaland Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 1105 (2003).
80 Lawrence Gostin, Public Health Law In An Age Of Terrorism:
Rethinking
Individual Rights And Common Goods, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 79, 88 (2002),
availableat http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/21/6/79.fuI1.htm1.
81See George Annas, Bioterrorism,PublicHealth and Civil Liberties, 346 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 1337, 1340 (2002); ASS'N AM. PHYS. & SURGEONS, MODEL
79

EMERGENCY

HEALTH POWERS

ACT TURNS

GOVERNORS INTO DICTATORS

(2001), available at http://www.aapsonline.org/testimony/emerpower.htm;
Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act,
19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW & POL'Y 379, 390(2003). See also AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Q's & A's ON THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH
POWERS ACT (2002), availableat http://www.aclu.org/privacy/medical/14857res

20020101.html.

Buffalo Public Interest Law Journal

Vol. XXX

(4) protection of persons, powers to compel vaccination,
testing, treatment, isolation, and quarantine when clearly
necessary; and
(5) communication, providing clear and authoritative
information to the public.
C. The More Controversial Provisions of the
Model Act
The more controversial provisions of the Model Act are in
Articles II, V, VI and VIII which address Public Health
Authorities/Powers (investigations and compulsory medical
treatment), Public Health Emergencies (use of private property and
82
liability), and criminal and civil enforcement and immunities.
The Model Act at § 1-102 also contains definitions of 67 terms.
Under 2-104 of the Model Act, public health authorities
may "provide or implement essential public health services and
functions, including services or functions" on a long list of openended activities. That "including" phrase arguably indicates that
the government has broad authority beyond the literal language of
the statute 8 3
Section 5-101 (b)(4) provides that:
[a] state or local public health agency shall employ the least
restrictive alternative in the exercise of its authorities or
powers, especially compulsory powers .... Employing the
least restrictive alternative does not require the agency to
adopt policies or programs that are less effective in
protecting the public's health or safety.
Section 5-101 (c)(1) requires health officials, when possible,
to request individuals to voluntarily participate in the program
when mandatory or compulsory powers are involved. The only
82 THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT

(Discussion Draft

2001), availableat www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php.

See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fish Serv., 340 F.3d
969, 975 (9th Cir. 2003); World Wide Const. Services, Inc. v. Chapman, 683
P.2d 1198, 1201 (Colo. 1984) (Quinn, J., dissenting).
8,
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case found that defined "least restrictive alternative" in a healthcare statute, held that when an individual is a danger to84him/herself
or others, involuntary institutionalization was justified.
Section 5-104 of the Model Act, health authorities may
investigate not only emergency situations, but non-emergency
situations too, with an eye to preventing them from developing
into emergencies.
Section 5-106 authorizes both consensual and mandatory
testing and examination. Mandatory testing and examination is
authorized when a person has or may have been "exposed to a
contagious disease that poses a significant risk or danger to the
public's health." Under that section, compulsory screening is
authorized "for conditions of public health importance that pose a
significant risk or seriously threaten the public's health."
"Mandatory treatment" under § 5-107 is required as to any
person who has been or may have been exposed to a contagious
disease that poses a significant risk do danger to others or the
public's health .

. . ."

Under § 5-107(b), mandatory treatment

includes completion of a "prescribed course of medication.., and
...

infection control ....

."

As noted later, "treatment" has been

held to include vaccination.
Section 5-108 addresses quarantine and isolation pursuant
to rules or regulations promulgated by the State public health
agency. It also lists the condition and principles governing
isolations and quarantines, including use of the "least restrictive
means necessary to prevent the spread of a contagious or possibly
contagious disease" and separation of isolated individuals from
those who are under quarantine.
Section 5-108 also states that: "[t]o the extent possible,
cultural and religious beliefs shall be respected in addressing the
needs of individuals, and establishing and maintaining isolation
and quarantine premises." Case law indicates that "to the extent

84 In re Wilson, 431 So. 2d 552, 554 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). See also In re Doe,

102 Hawaii 528, 548-49, (Haw. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there must be clear

and convincing evidence of danger to civilly commit an individual.)
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possible" requires nothing more than creation of a85sufficient record
to show that the agency did not act unreasonably.
Section 5-108 further provides for temporary isolation and
quarantine without notice to the person placed in isolation or
quarantine, when "delay . . . would significantly jeopardize the

agency's ability to prevent the transmission of contagious or
potentially contagious disease to others." Within 10-days of
directing a temporary isolation of quarantine, the state agency shall
petition a court to authorized continued temporary isolation or
quarantine.
Section 5-108 also authorizes isolation or quarantine with
prior notice, so long as there is a prompt court hearing on any
petition within 48-hours or as otherwise provided by a particular
State's version of the Model Act. The Model Act directs courts to
appoint counsel for individuals affected, with appointments lasting
for the duration of the isolation or quarantine of the person or
persons affected. The state agency is then required to provide
"adequate means of communication" between those persons and
their counsel.
Section 5-109 addresses vaccinations and does not
expressly authorize involuntary vaccination, except for attendance
at public schools and children's day-care. Under § 5-109(h)(4),
"[n]o individual shall be required to be vaccinated pursuant to this
Section when .

. .

. [t]he individual objects in a written, signed

affidavit issued pursuant to court order on the basis that the
vaccination interferes with the free exercise of the individual's
sincere religious beliefs." Since courts have extended the First
Amendment to similar non-religious-based core beliefs, it seems
likely that a court would extend or apply § 5-109(h)(4) to those
other types of beliefs.
Despite the lack of express authority in § 5-109 to mandate
vaccinations, the compulsory screening, medical treatment
(including an "appropriately prescribed course of medication"),
and quarantine and isolations addressed in §§ 5-106 through 5-108
85

See City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967, 976 (2nd Cir.

1976).
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seem to capture and express that authority as part of broader
mandatory treatment powers. As will be seen, § 6-104 also
authorizes state health agencies to "use every available means to
prevent the transmission of infectious disease ... and apply proper
control and treatment in all cases of infectious disease . ... " That

includes the power under § 6-104 to "perform or administer tests,
examinations, screenings, treatment, isolation, quarantine,
decontamination, or vaccination consistent with § 5-106, § 5-107,
§ 5-108, and § 5-109." As noted below, "treatment" has been held
to include vaccination.
While § 5-107 the Model Act expressly provides for
mandatory or compulsory medical "treatment" (apparently
including vaccination), traditional rules of statutory interpretation
would seem to give priority to § 5-109 as the law that specifically
addresses compulsory vaccination. But a court might well come to
a different conclusion by first reading §§ 5-107, 5-109 and other
parts of the Model Act together as part of a single statute and thus
"incorporating" the mandatory powers of § 5-107 into § 5-109,
standing alone or pursuant to the "every available means" and
"may administer . . . vaccination" language of § 6-104(a) and (b)
and/or interpreting "pursuant to a court order" in
§ 5-109(h)(4) as recognizing inherent judicial power and discretion
to inquiring into the merits of claims of religious-based exemptions
coming before the court.
Those issues are unresolved as to the Model Act, but would
likely be answered in the government's
favor under traditional
86
rules of statutory interpretations.
Creating an additional hurdle for persons asserting a
religious exemption to mandatory vaccination, many States require

16

See Caselnova v. N. Y. State Dep't of Health, 91 N.Y.2d 441, 444-45 (1998)

(reading different health laws together); Miller v. Ala.State Bar, 711 S.2d 917,
923 (Ala. 1997) (stating that the court has "inherent power to inquire into the
merits . . . and to take any action it sees fit") (citing Simpson v. Ala. State Bar,
294 Ala. 52 (1975)).
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those claiming religious exemptions to also assert that
their
87
religious beliefs preclude them from any and all vaccines.
Persons administering or authorizing vaccinations are
immune from civil and criminal liability for: (A) simple negligence
or (B) for failure to vaccinate due to a88 person's or his/her
representative's refusal or failure to consent.
Section 5-111 empowers government to abate public health
nuisances, including taking "immediate action" when warranted,
with the State allowed to pay the costs of abatement or seek
reimbursement from "responsible persons."
Section 5-112 addresses administrative searches and
inspections, with or without the consent of an owner.
"[A]dministrative search warrants" are authorized, indicating that
the heads of State agencies have authority to issue such warrants.
In cases where "a nuisance is known . . . to exist . . . and the

nuisance poses an immediate threat," health official may enter
property without an owner's consent and without administrative
search warrant to evaluate the situation. Officials may enter any
"public place," apparently without consent of an owner and
without an administrative search warrant.
Section 6-101(b)(4) requires public health emergency plans
to address the "continued, effective operation of the judicial system
including the potential identification and training of personnel to
serve as emergency judges for matters of isolation and quarantine."
Sections 6-101(b)(7) and (9) address "treatment, decontamination,
or vaccination of individuals" and the "safe and effective"
protection of individuals isolated, quarantined, vaccinated, tested,
treated, or decontaminated" during a public health emergency.
87 Margaret J. Kochuba, Comment, Public Health vs. Patient Rights:
Reconciling Informed Consent with HPV Vaccination, 58 EMORY L. J. 761, 783

n. 162 (2009) (noting that Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Virginia, among other states, have "strict policies against partial
exemption.")
88

See ANGIE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21414, MANDATORY

VACCINATIONS:

PRECEDENT AND CURRENT LAWS(2005)

(noting that West

Virginia is the only State that does not exempt mandatory vaccination on the
basis of religious belief), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21414.pdf.
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Section 6-101(b)(1 1) requires emergency plans to address
"[r]elevant cultural norms, values, religious principles, and
traditions," while § 6-101(b)(12) authorizes plans to include
unspecified "[o]ther
measures necessary to carry out the purposes
89
of this Article."
Section 6-102 states when and how a governor may declare
a public health emergency and lists the contents of declarations of
public health emergencies and the effect of a declaration. Section
6-102(d) lists the emergency powers that governors have,
including suspending the operations of certain state laws and
regulations. Section 6-102(d) does not expressly limit emergency
powers to those listed therein, nor does it address methods of
statutory interpretation that courts should use in construing § 6102. Under § 6-102(d), State health authorities are vested with
power to enforce orders issued pursuant to the Model Act,
including seeking the help of the "organized militia."
Section 6-102 also addresses termination of declarations of
emergency by: (A) executive order, (B) automatic termination 30days after declaration unless extended for an additional 30-day
period(s) by the governor under the same standards governing an
initial declaration of emergency, or (C) declaration by a majority
of both chambers of a state legislature. Section 6-102 does not
address possible action by a court to terminate a declaration of
emergency.
Section 6-103 deals with management of property during
public health emergencies, including closing and decontamination
of property, acquiring or condemning property, using and
managing health care facilities, and destroying and controlling
materials. Section 6-103 also deals with control of medical
materials, roads and public areas, and the disposal of human
remains without expressly providing how or if religious and
similar beliefs may affect the disposal of human remains. When
'9

See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fish Ser., supra note

84, 340 F.3d at 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2003); Chapman, 683 P.2d at 1201 (Colo.
1984) (noting the open-ended language indicates broad authority beyond literal
language of the statute).
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the State contemplates the destruction of property, the state public
health agency shall initiate a civil action seeking court orders to
proceed (pursuant to normal rules of procedure or other special
emergency rules created by courts).
Section 6-104 authorizes state health agencies to "use every
available means to prevent the transmission of infectious disease
. . .and apply proper control and treatment in all cases of
infectious disease. .. ." That includes the power to "perform or

administer tests, examinations, screenings, treatment, isolation,
quarantine, decontamination, or vaccination consistent with § 5106, § 5-107, § 5-108, and § 5-109."9o
Section 6-105 grants civil immunity to private parties who
consent without compensation to the State's use of their property.
Civil immunity also extends to non-governmental persons and their
employees who perform contracts with the State under the State's
direction, if the death, injury or damage was not due to their gross
negligence or willful misconduct-and provided that the acts or
omissions of non-governmental person or employees or agents did
not cause the emergency in whole or in part.
Section 6-106 directs the State to pay just compensation to
owners of facilities lawfully used or appropriated by a state or
local health agency for temporary or permanent use during an
emergency. Section 6-103 prohibits compensation paid to owners
of property that is closed, evacuated, decontaminated, or destroyed
when there is reason to believe that their continued use would
endanger the public health. Private parties may sue the State for
90 See e.g. People v. Steinberg, 190 Misc. 413, 414-15 (1947) (noting that "[i]t is

argued that the vaccination was not a diagnosis, an operation, a treatment nor a
prescription and further that all of the aforesaid terms presuppose the existence
of human disease or disorder. Treatment is a very generalterm. Vaccination is a
treatmentgiven to a human being, even though no disease is present, to prevent

disease... particularly of the contagious kind such as smallpox. It is treatment
as well as preventive medicine. In our modern age, the great progress of science
is evidenced among other things by preventive medicine which is adopted even
before disease makes its appearance and precisely to bar it from the human
organism (emphasis added)).
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just compensation in amounts calculated in the same manner as in
non-emergency eminent domain cases.
Section 8-101 authorizes state and local public health
agencies to issue rules and regulations to implement the Model
Act.
Section 8-103 provides the procedural due process that is to
be granted to all persons after reasonable notice, unless otherwise
provided elsewhere in the Model Act, including a list of individual
rights, subpoenas and witnesses, a record of the proceedings, and
appeals to courts.
Section 8-104 lists criminal penalties for willfully violating
any provision, regulation or order under the Model Act. Violations
are punishable as misdemeanors, with enhanced penalties for
subsequent convictions.
Section 8-105 outlines civil remedies that aggrieved
persons may seek in court, including actual and punitive damages
and attorney fees. Responsible parties are jointly and severally
liable. The Model Act does not limit or expand the rights of
aggrieved persons to recover damages under other applicable law.
Section 8-106 authorizes State Attorney General to sue
civilly to enforce compliance with the Model Act, with relief
issued under §§ 8-104 and 8-105.
Section 8-107 grants immunity to the State, state agencies,
the governor, state and local health agencies, and other state and
local officials and agencies for the death of or injury to individuals
and for damage to property in attempting to comply with the
Model Act, unless the tort was grossly negligent or willful. The
immunity extends coverage toe state and local health agencies for
acts or omissions of "private sector partners" working with state or
local health officials.
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LIBERAL READING OF DISASTER/
EMERGENCY-RELATED LEGISLATION

As noted, public
interpreted. 91
Laws authorizing
the public good are also
law is to be broadly read,

health laws are remedial and liberally
public agencies to act in furtherance of
broadly construed. 92 Because a remedial
limitations
on the operation of a remedial
93

law are to be strictly construed.
If need be, courts
will read clarifying language into a law to
94
avoid an unjust result.
Courts have thus liberally interpreted public health laws,
even if they were enforceable by criminal penalties like those in
95
the Model Act.
91

See Ruffing ex rel. Calton v. Union Carbide Corp., 193 Misc.2d 350, 374, 746

N.Y.S.2d 798, 817 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (noting that "CERCLA is . . . a
remedial statute ... to protect and preserve public health and the environment"
which courts "are therefore obligated to construe . . . liberally") (quoting
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st
Cir. 1986).
92 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 160 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress was presumably aware that we do not readily infer
congressional intent to limit an agency's power . . ."). See also Crusco v.

Oakland Care Center, Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 605, 610-11, 702 A.2d 1363, 1366
(App. Div. 1997) ("Classically, remedial legislation ... is to be accorded liberal
construction. Logically, therefore, any stated limitation on its sweep or
applicability must be strictly construed"); NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE
SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 65; 3 nn.1, 6-7 & 18
( 7th ed. 2011).

93Crusco, A.2d at 1365.
94 N. J. Coal. Of Rooming and Boarding House Owners v. Mayor and Council,
152 F.3d 217, 227 n.8 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("[A] court 'may engage in judicial
surgery to .. . engraft [in] a needed meaning"') (citation omitted); Catholic

Cmty. Serv. v. City of Newark, 21 N.J. Tax 633, 637-38 (2004) ("[a] court is not
precluded from interpreting a remedial statute to apply in circumstances not
specifically considered by its drafters" and using "judicial surgery" if necessary).
95NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBLE SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 73:2 n.7 (7th ed. 2011) ("[c]ourts are [still]
inclined to give health statutes a liberal interpretation despite the fact that such
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VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
MANDATORY VACCINATION PROGRAMS
A. Jacobson is Still "The Law" - Arguments and
Counter-Arguments
96
Jacobsonv. Massachusettsis still "the law" on this point.
In addition to the language in the opening quote of this paper, the
JacobsonCourt added that:
Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual to
use his own, whether in respect of his person or property,
regardless of the injury that may be done to others ....
Upon the principle of self-defense, or paramount necessity,
a community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease .... 97
This principle is part of the common law. 98 Arizona,
Maryland, Nevada, and other states have upheld mandatory
vaccination programs even if no epidemic actually existed. 99
statutes may ... impose criminal penalties") (citing United States v. Lewis, 235
U.S. 282 (1914); State v. Mountjoy, 891 P.2d 376 (Kan. 1995)).
96 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (favorably citing Jacobson).
See also D. George Joseph, Uses of Jacobson in the Age of Terror, 290 J. AM.
MED.
Ass'N2331
(Nov.
5,
2003)
available at http://jama.amaassn.org/cgi/content/full/290/17/2331 (last visited Oct. 11, 2011); James
Colgrove & Ronald Bayer, Manifold Restraints:Liberty, Public Health, and the
Legacy of Jacobson v Massachusetts, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 571 (Apr. 2005)
available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstract/95/4/571 (last visited Oct.
11,2011).
97
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27.
98 In Re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F.Supp.2d 520, 550 (S.D.
N.Y. 2006); Pemberton v. City of Greensboro, 208 N.C. 466, 470, 181 S.E. 258,
261 (1935) ("salus populi suprema lex").
99 Maricopa County Health Dep't v. Harmon, 750 P.2d 1364, 1369-70 (Ariz.
App. 1987) (measles); Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 377-78, 451 A.2d 107, 111
(1982) (citing New Jersey, New York, and federal cases); Owens v. City of
North Las Vegas, 85 Nev. 105, 110, 450 P.2d 784, 787 (1969) (stating that we
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Thus, persons objecting to mandatory vaccination have
traditionally had limited rights. The Supreme Court cited Jacobson
in support of forced "mass vaccinations and .100
. . quarantines of
'

Americans even if they show no signs of illness."
One appeals court has held that a compelling government
interest exists to mandate involuntary10 1immunization to prevent or
curb the spread of infectious disease.
As one commentator concluded: "Without question, the use
of compulsory vaccination in the0 2 proper situation would . . .
weather any later legal challenge."'
"There can be little doubt that, even if there were not an
explicit rule providing for suspensions where students posed risks
to others on account of medical conditions, the school had
implied
03
authority to exercise the police power for that purpose."'

should "prevent even the unintentional development of conditions which are
hazardous to public health").
100 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 592 (2004). See also Roe v. Wade, 410

U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (stating that no one "has an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases") (citing Jacobson) & Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (upholding forced injection of antipsychotic drug when
prisoner dangerous to others).
101See McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997).
102 Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Grapes of Wrath, PartII, 8 J. MED. & L. 1, 33 &
n.201 (2003-2004). See also Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of
Prevention: The Right of Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1988-1989) (stating that the Supreme Court has yet
to place clear restrictions on emergency public health action).
103 LaVine v. Blaine School Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 727 n.33 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Reinhardt, C.J., Kleinfeld and Kozinski, JJ., dissenting from denial of en banc
rehearing) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37-38 & State v. Armstrong, 39
Wash.2d 860, 865, 239 P.2d 545, 548-9 (1952)). See also Miller v. Campbell
County, 722 F.Supp. 687, 692 (D. Wyo. 1989) (finding that the "state ...has
inherent police powers to protect the public health . . .") (citing Supreme Court
decisions) & McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing compelling government interest in preventing or curbing spread of
disease).
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B. Major Themes in American Justice:
Individual vs. Community Interests
Mandatory vaccination or treatment raises hot-button issues
that touch on perhaps the two strongest and not yet fully
resolved
104
currents of American justice: Community and Liberty.
The tension between individual autonomy and community
interests surfaced in a revealing manner in a case challenging a law
mandating the wearing of helmets by motorcyclists. The court
noted that: "We do not understand a state of mind that permits
plaintiff [motorcyclist] to think that only he himself is concerned"
as to the consequences of potential massive brain injuries resulting
from motorbike accidents, also noting Kentucky and New York
cases recognizing "the state's generalized assertion
of an interest in
05
citizenry."'
its
of
productivity
continued
the
The "social cost" that often results from the exercise of
individual rights has been with us for some time and can be
expected to play a large, if silent, role in litigation during times of
economic distress, as now, to the likely disadvantage of persons
objecting to
mandatory treatment during public health
10 6
emergencies.
C. Section 5-108 of the Model Act and Religious/
Philosophical Exemptions
Of course, § 5-108 of the Model Act does provide for religious and philosophical exemptions from mandatory vaccination
"to the extent possible." But what the "extent possible" might be
104

Lawrence 0. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens Health: How Far Are

Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV.

1105 (2003) (discussing America's competing individual and communitarian
legal and social philosophies).
105 Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277, 279 n.1 (D. Mass. 1972), aff'd
per
curiam, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972). See also Benning v. State, 161 Vt. 472, 641 A.2d
757 (1994) (same effect); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir.
1997) (recognizing compelling government interest in preventing or curbing
spread of disease); Thaddeas Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against
Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419,

435-45 (1999-2000).
106See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &ECON. 1 (1960).
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could very well vary widely under the circumstances (such as
limited, nonexistent, or arguably ineffective quarantine and
isolation resources) to the point that no religious or philosophical
exemptions were allowed in cases of serious danger when
individuals felt that "the most" was at stake for them and their
genuinely-held beliefs.
Further, a federally-declared emergency would likely preempt any rights arising under state law that were deemed to
interfere with federal emergency operations. The additional
discussion in the section on the Model Act indicates that the
prognosis for a religious-based claim of exemption under the
Model Act would not likely succeed.
Thus, those who oppose mandatory vaccination or other
treatment on First Amendment grounds would likely still have to
overcome Jacobson vs. Massachusetts and its progeny in truly
serious public health emergencies. The civil rights aspects of
mandatory immunization are omnipresent and almost certainly to
be asserted if and when a government program is proposed or
initiated. Opponents of mandatory vaccination note that rights
are
07
not really rights, if they may be trumped by the government.'
D. Arguments Pro and Con
Some in the legal profession thus surmise that we are now
in a new, undeclared era of constitutional law involving preparing
for and dealing with emergencies in pandemic situations. But that
seems to be a slippery slope that can cut either or both ways-with
some arguing that a "new era" should allow courts to fully
reexamine the legal and medical underpinnings of Jacobson, while
others would urge that the "new era" of a "permanent state of
emergency" should have just the opposite result with individuals
having to yield to the omnipresent greater-good.
Arguments favoring an exemption from mandatory
10 8
vaccination in public health emergencies are outlined above.
107 See Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 94-96 (1977).
108 See also David Buchanan, Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical

Priorities in Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15 (2008). See generally

Fisher, supra,note 30.
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Those arguments by opponents of mandatory vaccination
are not insubstantial. Mandatory treatment arguably encourages
some individuals to hide or conceal their condition for a range of
reasons (including10 9employment-related ones), thus increasing the
spread of disease.
Opponents also claim that our current approach
"stigmatizes" the sick and subjects them to harsh penalties that
have are really quasi-criminal in nature.1 10 Further, health officials'
coercive authority is seen as central rather than peripheral,
resulting in action that departs from "public health law's
democratic moorings"-an approach that ignores respect for
individual dignity and rights, while instead focusing health
officials on the powers that they can wield. 111

109

Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives: The Perils of Individualizing

Public Health Problems,30 J. LEGAL MED. 83 (2009).
110 Id. at 106 n.147 (citing Susan Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679 (1999)).
111Id. at 105-06. Experts agree that the "benefits of preemptive, voluntary
vaccination are great ....

Vaccination before exposure dramatically reduces the

value of smallpox as a [biologic terrorist] weapon." William J. Bicknell, The
Case for Voluntary Smallpox Vaccination, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1323 (2002).
As noted above, when health officials conclude in good faith that vaccination
before an epidemic arrives is warranted, the life-preserving effect of vaccinating
people before exposure should "dramatically reduce" the value of any bio-terror
plagues. "The court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to
pass legislation [and delegate authority to agencies] in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty . . . . 'When Congress undertakes to act in
areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must
be especially broad'." Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (citing
Supreme Court decisions). See also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3
(1997) ("it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have
been afforded the widest latitude"). Health/safety regulation is thus an area
where courts have accorded agencies "the greatest leeway" in turning
back claims for damages or eminent domain "takings" resulting from gardenvariety regulatory action in emergencies or exigent circumstances. Rose Acre
Farms, 559 F.3d at 1281, infra note 168. Similarly, even loss of human life due
to the government's initiatives taken during emergencies might not be
compensable, depending on circumstances, absent a statutory mandate to the
contrary. Infra note 174.
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This leads, according to opponents of forced vaccination, to
an overuse of those coercive powers and to deferential courts that
then legitimize the diminution of individual rights. 112 Perhaps
worse, there is a lengthy history of health officials using
emergency powers to discriminate
against minorities under the
13
health."'
guise of "public
For the time being, though, Jacobson is still the law,
supplemented
as to state-declared emergencies by the Model
14
Act.

1

E. Providing Exemptions from Vaccination on
Basis of Religion/Philosophy
A 1990 Supreme Court decision casts doubt on the validity
and public-policy of exempting persons from mandatory
vaccination and other treatment in times of bonafide public health
emergencies, on the basis of even genuinely-held religious, moral,
or philosophical beliefs.115
There, the Supreme Court stated:
The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitionsof socially harmful conduct, like its ability to
carry out other aspects ofpublic policy, 'cannotdepend on
112

Parmet, supra,note 110, at 107-08.
at 104 n.137 (discussing discrimination against Chinese-Americans and

113 Id.

Middle Eastern and Jewish persons).
114 North Carolina follows Jacobson. See In re Moore's Sterilization, 289 N.C.
95, 103-04, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312-13 (1976) (upholding government-mandated
sterilization of mentally retarded); In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 79, 152 S.E.2d
317, 326 (1967) (upholding contempt citation against minister objecting to
testifying in criminal trial on religious grounds). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 592 (2004) (citing Jacobson as "upholding legislated mass
vaccination and approving of forced quarantines of Americans even if they show
no signs of illness) & Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.App.3d 736, 741-42, 276
Cal. Rptr. 660, 662-63 (1990) (requiring mandatory AIDS vaccination of
prostitutes, noting that public health emergency action that might otherwise be
unconstitutional is often upheld under "the 'special needs' doctrine").
115 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding denial
of
unemployment benefits due to job-dismissal for religious-based peyote use).
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measuring the effects of a governmental action on a
religious objector's spiritual development.' To make an
individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon
the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except
where the State's interest is 'compelling'-permittinghim,
by virtue of his beliefs, "to become a law unto himself,"contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense
...
. The 'compelling government interest' requirement
seems benign, because it is familiar from other fields. But
using it as the standard that must be met before the
government may accord different treatment on the basis of
race, or before the government may regulate the content of
speech, is not remotely comparable to using it for the
purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other
fields-equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of
contending speech-are constitutional norms; what it
would produce here a private right to ignore
generally
16
applicable laws-is a constitutionalanomaly.
In a footnote, the Court said:
[W]e have held that generally applicable laws unconcerned
with regulating speech that have the effect of interfering
with speech do not thereby become subject to compellinginterest analysis under the First Amendment . ...
Our
conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious
practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest is the only approach compatible with these
precedents. 117
The Court pursued that discussion as to why proof of a
"compelling government interest" was not required in cases like a
denial of unemployment benefits or perhaps denial of an
116

Id. at 885-86 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

117 Id.

at 886 n. 3 (emphasis added).
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exemption from mandatory treatment during public health
emergencies, in terms that seems to clearly reject any claim to a
constitutional right (as opposed to statutory claims under the
Model Act) as to a religious-based exemption to mandatory
vaccination and treatment during times of public health
emergencies:
Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents'
proposal by requiring a 'compelling state interest' only
when the conductprohibitedis 'central' to the individual's
religion. It is no more appropriate for judges to determine
the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a
'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field, than it
would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas
before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free
speech field. What principleof law or logic can be brought
to bear to contradicta believer's assertion that a particular
act is 'central' to his personalfaith? Judgingthe centrality
of different religiouspractices isakin to the unacceptable
'business of evaluating the relative merits of differing
religious claims.'As we reaffirmed only last Term, '[it is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.'
Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned
that courts must not presume to determine the place of a
particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a
religious claim ....If the 'compellinginterest' test is to be
applied at all, then, it must be appliedacross the board,to
all actions thought to be religiously commanded ....Any
society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy,
but that danger increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination
to coerce or suppress none of them ....[so that] as applied
to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that
does not protect an interest of the highest order [would
fail]. The rule respondentsfavor would open the prospect
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of constitutionallyrequiredreligiousexemptionsfrom civic
obligationsof almost every conceivable kind ranging from
compulsory military service, to the payment of taxes,] to
health and safety regulationsuch as manslaughter and child
neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, drug laws, and
traffic laws, to social welfare legislation such as minimum
wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws,
environmental protection laws, and laws providing for
equality of opportunity for the races. The First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not

require this. 118
The Court concluded by noting that the above constitutional
scheme was not only valid but was "prefer[able] to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all
religious beliefs," even if "leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those whose religious
practices ... are not widely engaged in .... ',119 North Carolina
earlier adopted that reasoning in upholding a contempt ruling
against a minister 12who
objected on religious grounds to testifying
0
in a criminal trial.
F. Requirements for a Sound Mandatory
Vaccination Program
There are, of course, many medical and administrative
steps that must be taken if a sound mandatory vaccination program
is to be instituted and implemented. 121
"'8Id. at 886-89 (emphasis added in part Court's and in part added)(internal
citations omitted).
119 Id. at 890 (noting that "a number of States have made an exception to their
drug laws for sacramental peyote use.").
120 In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 79, 152 S.E.2d 317, 326 (1967).
121 Those steps are outlined in U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Public Health Emergency Response Guide for State, Local and Tribal Public
Health Directors(2006).
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The failure to take those steps (including developing and
testing a vaccine before being used) in a clearly reasonable manner
would seem to provide an additional basis for objecting to
mandatory vaccination orders. Objections might be based on
statutory or regulatory grounds, such as the government's failure to
comply with medical and related standards-and that the
government's demanding individuals to undergo mandatory
vaccinations violated due process when either the proper medical
procedures and safeguards were not followed or the vaccine itself
was of questionable quality or effectiveness.
The outline of a potential substantive due process challenge
when the government failed to comply with medical standards in
establishing and implementing a mandatory vaccination program
or when the vaccine itself was suspect were discussed in a 1991
Connecticut case. In vacating as premature an injunction against
enforcement of a state law imposing a criminal penalty for refusing
to assist a police officer or firefighter when commanded, the
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that:
While minor intrusions on the personal security of an
individual have been permitted to accommodate some
public necessity, the Supreme Court has often observed that
certain intrusions might be forbidden entirely. When, for
instance, the court upheld against a due process challenge
to a Massachusetts statute compelling individuals to submit
to vaccinations for smallpox, it nevertheless noted that the
judiciary could and should intervene to prohibit a
vaccination if an individual established, to a 'reasonable
certainty' that such vaccination 'wouldseriously impairhis
health or probably cause his death.' One commentator has
noted that most courts would be 'properly reluctant' to
validate on due process grounds any intrusion risking
'irreversibleinjury to health, and the danger to life itself'
...

The government is not, to be sure, wholly without the

power to compel ordinary individuals to risk their lives [in
defense of the nation] ....

Yet, as the court below correctly

concluded, the federal power to conscript individuals
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differs significantly from the power granted to police
officers by the statute at issue here. The federal power
arises from an express constitutional grant, while the police
officer's power does not; and the federal power has been
exercised through a highly regulated procedure that
carefully defines eligibility for service, manner of selection,
and available deferments and exemptions, and provides for
review of individual decisions, while the peace officer's
authority is, in the words of the trial court, inevitably
"summary, ad hoc, and unreviewable" at the time when
obedience is compelled ....

Although the government can,

in certain circumstances, compel individuals to risk their
physical safety, it cannot compel such a risk arbitrarily.
The touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government. The great
purpose of the [due process] requirement is to exclude
everything that is arbitrary and capricious in legislation
affecting the rights of the citizen. 122
Most individuals would lack access to the factual history as
to the government's improper implementation of a mandatory
vaccination program or facts indicating that a vaccine's safety was
questionable-and would not be in the best position to prove or
establish the facts. Thus, a court should be willing to reduce the

122

State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 87-88 (1991) (emphasis added). See also

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (1905) (Massachusetts Court upholding vaccination
law); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1333
(2d ed. 1988) (commentator finding that most courts would be "properly
reluctant" to validate on due process grounds any intrusion risking "irreversible
injury to health, and the danger to life itself'); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 558 (1974) (holding that the touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government). For the proposition that "the
great purpose of the due process requirement is to exclude everything that is
arbitrary and capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizens," see
State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73, 87-88 (1991) & Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114, 123-24 (1889). See generally Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1918).
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degree and extent of a person's burden of proof in that regard to
something far less than proving a case to a "reasonable certainty."
If courts still insisted that a person must at least approach a
"reasonably certainty" degree of proof, courts should be willing to
grant a person wide leeway in conducting pretrial discovery or an
investigation (with subpoenas) before even seeking judicial
review. 123
It is true that "modern medical protections" might have
appeal if it were documented. But if America ever again faced
anything like the Spanish Influenza of 1918 or a "Dark Winter"like pandemic, an exemption claim based on "modern medical
protections" might not succeed if isolation or quarantine resources
in place were not adequate or questionable.
IX.

QUARANTINES AND ISOLATION

Alternatives to mandatory vaccination include quarantine
and isolation, which are mentioned in the Model Act. Arguments
have been made regarding whether or not quarantine for a
considerable time is a greater or lesser encroachment on
individuals than mandatory vaccination. 124
123In re Tyndall, 360 B.R. 68, 73 (Bkrtcy. D. Del. 2007) (citing Lindahl v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 776 F.2d 276, 280 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding "the party
with the best knowledge normally has the burden of proof') & Merriam v.
Venida Blouse Corp., 23 F. Supp. 659, 661 (D.N.Y. 1938) (holding "the party
who is in the best position to know the facts bears the burden of explanation")
(internal citations omitted)). See also Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F.Supp. 243,
250-51 (D. Minn. 1972) (stating "when a statutory classification ...affects a
'fundamental right,' the burden of proof shifts and such a classification will be
held to deny equal protection unless it can be justified by a 'compelling
governmental interest') (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627
(1969)); East Hartford Ed. Ass'n v. Board of Ed., 562 F.2d 838, 852 n.ll (2d
Cir. 1977) (finding the "state must carry the burden of proof when it... burdens
the exercise of a 'fundamental' right") (citing United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969));
See also Fisher, supra,note 30; and Segev, supra,note 30, at 629.
124
See Mark A. Rothstein, Are TraditionalPublic Health Strategies Consistent
with Contemporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 175 (2004); Mark
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Although momentary, vaccination might cause permanent
illness and other problems many days, weeks or even months in the
future. The government's choice between mandatory vaccination
and quarantining is apparently one that courts25will not question,
absent a clear violation of constitutional rights.1
Large-scale isolation may not adequately protect, especially
on short notice, due to inadequate
housing, storage, health
126
factors.
other
and
security,
personnel,
Compounding the problem with quarantining is the
possibility that stockpiles of protective
equipment for health-care
127
workers may not be adequate.
Many States have inadequate resources to implement
effective quarantines. 12 8 Prior to the Model Act, State quarantine
laws were an "overall antiquity" with many being over 140-years
old and focus on particular diseases. 129 Those
who are not actually
30
sick but are carriers can be quarantined.

Hitchcock, Government Rights to Quarantine: An Examination Under the
Modem Notion of Due Process (May 28, 2007) (unpublished paper, University
of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law).
125 See Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 13-14, 21, 26 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1900)
(invalidating quarantine law directed only to persons of Chinese ancestry). As
noted, "[t]raditionally, the States have been allowed broad discretion in the
formulation of measures designed to protect and promote public health." People
v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 605 (Ill. 1992).
126 See Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following
Biological
Terrorism in the United States, 286 JAMA 2711, 2713-15 (2001); see also
Daniel Markovits, Quarantinesand DistributiveJustice,33 J. L.MED. & ETHICS
323 (2005) (comparing legal and practical aspects of quarantine and
vaccination).
127 See Terri Rebmann et. al, A Home Health Agency's PandemicPreparedness
and Experience with the 2009 H1N] Pandemic, AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL,
June 13, 2011. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/
news/jun1311 flunewsscan.html;http://microbiology.mtsinai.on.ca/avian/
healthCareWorkers.asp.
128 ANGIE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RI 31333, FEDERAL AND
STATE ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE AUTHORITY (2005).
129

Id. at 4 & nn.24- 26.

130

Id. at 7-8 & nn.53-58 (citing People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 134 N.E.

815 (Ill. 1922).
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Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of HHS
may issue regulations to prevent the introduction, transmission or
spread of communicable diseases into the States or from one State
to another. Federal quarantine law preempts State law to the extent
of any conflict.13' The apprehension and detention of persons to
prevent the spreading of communicable diseases is left to the
President.132 Quarantines
have been upheld in the face of right-to133
claims.
travel
X.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE
EMERGENCY ACTION

A. The Model Act
The Model Act does expressly provide for timely judicial
review. In practice, though, and despite Justice Holmes' hope that
courts would provide prompt and meaningful review even when
emergencies were ongoing, it remains to be seen as to what courts
are actually willing to address in the midst of a public health
emergency.
B. Court's Traditional Scope of Judicial Review
During Emergencies
Courts have rarely, if ever, summoned much "political
courage" in the face34 of action by Congress and the President
during emergencies.'
...
42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2006).
132 42 U.S.C. § 246(b); see also 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 70.6
(2003); Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (April 4, 2003).
133See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 15 (1965) ("The right to travel ... does not

mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire, or pestilence cannot be quarantined when
it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel to the area would directly and
materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the area or the Nation as a
whole."). See also Miller v. Campbell Cnty., 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting Takings Clause and Due Process claims when village was declared
uninhabitable and homeowners were ordered to evacuate).

134 David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: JudicialReview and Individual
Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2565 (2003); Mark Tushnet,
Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2673,
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Elsewhere, and citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts
approvingly, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, an
abortion case, stated: "The Court has given state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there
is medical and scientific uncertainty."' 35As a general matter,
differences among the medical community on the effectiveness of
a particular vaccine, for example, would probably not be enough to
invalidate a legislative or executive directive mandating
vaccination. As the JacobsonCourt stated:
The fact that the belief is not universal [in the medical
community] is not controlling, for there is scarcely any
belief that is accepted by everyone. The possibility that the
belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be
wrong, is not conclusive; for the legislature has the right to
pass laws which, according to common belief of the people,
are adapted to [address medical emergencies]. In a free
country, where government is by the people, through their
chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no
other standard of action. 136
2679 (2005); Christina E. Wells & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Foreword to
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Fear and Risk Perception in Times of
Democratic Crisis, 69 Mo. L. REV. 897 (2004); see also DAVID DYZENHAUS,

(2006).
135 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3
(1977); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-5 n.13 (1983); Lambert v.
Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926); Collin v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 297-98
(1912); Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30-31 (1905)); see also Marshall v. United States,
414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) ("When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught
with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially
broad."). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 592 (2004) (same effect
and citing Jacobson as "upholding legislated mass vaccinations and approving
of forced quarantines of Americans even if they show no signs of illness") &
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997) ("These disagreements,
however, do not tie the State's hands in setting the bounds of its civil
commitment laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that
legislatures have been afforded the widest latitude in drafting such statutes.")
136 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35. Jacobson also upheld "legislation imposing
punishment on persons refusing to be vaccinated. See also Washington v.
THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY
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It should be noted that when dealing with public health
emergencies, reality is often stranger and less predictable than
fiction, something that might well discourage courts from
departing from
traditional judicial approaches, at least during
1 37
emergencies.
C. Justiciability & Standing
The President's 38
declaring a state of emergency is
apparently nonjusticiable. 1
According to California, a declaration of emergency by
authorized officials "for the protection or preservation of health is
conclusive on the courts except only to the limitation that it must
be a reasonable determination, not an abuse of discretion, and must
not infringe rights secured by the Constitution."' 139 Even then, "the
injury must be 'certainly impending"' to warrant federal
intervention. 140
Even if constitutional rights were involved, federal courts
have ruled that "standing will not lie if 'adjudication ... rests upon

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 742 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 312 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27)).
137 See John D. Blum, Too Strange to Be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a
BioterroristSimulation, 54 LA. L. REv. 905 (2004).
.38Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 895 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding
inquiry that would require a court "to examine the President's motives and
justifications for declaring a national emergency . . . would likely present a

nonjusticiable political question") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Belk v. United States, 858 F.2d 706, 709-10 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Florsheim Shoe Co., Div. of Interco, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787,
795-96 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
139 Love, 226 Cal.App.3d at 741 (internal citations omitted).
140 Scott v. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the importance of imminence as related to claims brought under the
Equal Protection Clause) (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 211(1995)) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n. 2
(1992)).
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contingent future events that14 1may not occur as anticipated or
indeed may not occur at all.',
But the government's admission that it was "ready to
resume" the challenged activity kept a civil rights claim alive in
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 142 presumably
by adding "concreteness" of the claim and immediacy of harm to
the case.
Of course, traditional equity rules require that an individual
seeking an injunction against mandatory vaccination at least as to
him or herself, must show that issuance of an injunction would be
in the public interest. 143 The pro-vaccination arguments and caselaw cited above would seem to present a nearly insurmountable
"public interest" hurdle in that regard.
D. Pre-Emergency Preparation of the Judiciary
Just to get to the point where meaningful judicial review
during an emergency could be had, the legal preparation that
should be 4 taken in anticipation of a future emergency is
14

extensive.

141 Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 561 (3rd Cir. 2002) (internal citations
omitted); see also Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 307 (1998); State Bd. of
Chiropractic Exam'rs v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959, 969 (Colo. 1997) (stating "In
'rare circumstances,' a person may seek injunctive relief against continuing or
future government misconduct which" violates constitutional rights) (citing
Lemmons v. Law Firm of Morris & Morris, 39 F.3d 264, 267 (1994)). But if an
emergency were declared by federal authorities under federal law, Porter v.
Black, 175 P.2d 807 (1946) indicates that state courts would not act.
142 Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613
n.3
(1986).
14' Langlois v. Board of County Com'rs, 78 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Colo. App. 2004)

(holding that a plaintiff must show, among other factors, that the "threatened
injury outweighs the harm that the injunction may cause to the opposing party
[or the public] and [that] . . . the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect
the public interest") (citing Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175
(10th Cir. 2003) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546
n.12 (1987))).
144 See N. Pieter M. O'Leary, Cock-a-Doodle-Doo: Pandemic Avian Influenza
and the Legal Preparationand Consequences of an H5N1 Influenza Outbreak,
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Legal triage and thinking through the145
range of legal issues
that might arise during an emergency is vital.
Dealing with an influx of displaced and volunteer out-ofstate attorneys and other licensed professionals (including
physicians and judges) should also be addressed at the planning
stage.1 46 Of course, ample supplies of vaccine and other health
goods are a sine qua non. 14 7 But planning in advance and
preservation of liberties likely go 148
hand-in-hand, so that we can
avoid or minimize those trade-offs.
E. Speedy Trial Claims

Courts should also take into consideration the effect of
ongoing emergency conditions on criminal defendants' demands
for a speedy trial, whether or not enabling legislation expressly
addressed the situation. 149 Courts, though, should not become too
16 HEALTH MATRIX 511 (2006); Diane S. Mackey et al., JudicialPreparedness
for Public Health Emergencies,33 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 79 (2005).
145 See James G. Hodge, Jr., Legal Triage During Public Health Emergencies
and Disasters, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 638-40 (2006); John A. Heaton et al.,
Legal Preparednessfor PublicHealth Emergencies, 31 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 43
(2003).
146 See Sheryl B. Shapiro, American Bar Association's Response
to
Unauthorized Practice Problems Following Hurricane Katrina: Optimal or
Merely Adequate?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 905 (2007). See also George B.
Huff, Jr., Emergency Preparedness, Continuity Planning, and the Federal
Judiciary,45THE JUDGES' JOURNAL 7 (2006). The legal aspects of dealing with
the needs of children in the wake of an emergency should also be included in
any judicial emergency plan. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CHILDREN,
LAW, AND DISASTERS: WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM KATRINA AND THE
HURRICANES OF 2005 (2009).
147 Kapil Kumar Bhanot, Comment, What Defines a Public Health Emergency?

An Analysis of the Strategic National Stockpile and the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act: The Need for Prevention of Nonterror National Medical
Emergencies, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 137, 145-53 (2004) (arguing
that judicial deference in this area is probably great).

See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2006).
149 See Patrick Ellard, Note, Learning From Katrina:Emphasizing the Right to a
148

Speedy Trial to ProtectConstitutionalGuaranteesin Disasters,44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1207 (2007); Karen L. Helgeson, Note, The FederalJudiciaryEmergency
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comfortable with scripted plans for use in public health
emergencies, since reality is often15 stranger and less predictable
than fiction or simulated scenarios. 0
F. Professor Bruce Ackerman's
Recommendation
Yale law Professor Bruce Ackerman has suggested a
number of steps that Congress and legislatures should take to
honor civil liberties and assure meaningful judicial review during
or after emergencies.' 5 1 Those steps include:
"
"
*

A greatly expanded executive authority.
Internment during emergencies, without judicial review
or a hearing.
Release of detainees after 45-days if the government
does not connect them with the emergency.152

Special Sessions Act of 2005: Allowing Ongoing CriminalProsecutionsDuring
Crisis or Hindering Compliance with the Speedy Trial Act?, 92 IOWA L. REV.
245 (2006) (supporting position that new law does not fully address speedy trial
questions).
150 See John D. Blum, Too Strange to Be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from
a
BioterroristSimulation,54 LA. L. REv. 905 (2004).
151 Ackerman, supra,note 156, at 4-5, 19-22, 26, 39-57, 41-44, 80, 83-87, 90-96
(2006) (noting that if a major terrorist strike or two hit American soil,
Korematsu, which is "bad law, very bad law, very, very bad law," could quite
possibly be extended to internment of Middle Eastern and Islamic Americans.
"The war with Japan came to an end, but the war against terror will not."). See
also Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution,supra note 25, at 1043.
152 Without a hearing and confrontation, the door is open for self-serving
"accusations" by others who may also be interned or held on other charges, to
"finger" innocent persons. Confrontation is part of due-process in civil or
agency actions when the government denies or revokes a major benefit or
entitlement. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1978) (discussing proof
standards needed for "civil commitment for any purpose"); but see Morales v.
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that the government is
"not... required to provide the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial when
imposing a quarantine... against a highly communicable disease"). But due
process is still a "procedural floor below which even informal proceedings
cannot go" such as "opportunity to confront and cross-examine . ..when
credibility" and "factual determinations are made." Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d
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*

A grant of emergency powers to the President would
continue only if Congress consented.
" The President would have the power for a very short
time or perhaps one or two weeks, to act unilaterally.
* At the end of the short period, the state of emergency
would expire unless a majority of Congress voted to
sustain it.

*

After another 2-to-3 months passed, the state of
emergency would expire
unless 60 percent of Congress
53
it.1
sustain
to
voted

*

Increasingly higher super-majorities in Congress until
sustaining a state of emergency would require 80%
approval.
Eventual power-sharing and information-sharing
with
54
the President by select designees of Congress.'

*

XI.

OTHER ISSUES

A. "Drafting"/Mandating Health Providers to
Serve
Directing or ordering health care providers to serve and
assist in public health emergencies is perhaps one of the lurking
"latent" issues. The literature on the subject is not unanimous, with
some agreeing that there is a legal or ethical duty to serve and
others disagreeing. The Model Act does not address the issue
155
meaningfully.
809, 814-15 (7th Cir. 1999); see also American-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm. v.
Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir. 1995); ATL, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct.
374, 386 (1984) (same effect).
"' The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1621-39 (1996), imposes time limits on emergency powers. In enacting the
National Emergencies Act, Congress declared all previous declared emergencies
terminated. See also Vermeule, supranote 33, at 191-92.
154 Professor Ackerman's thesis has been criticized by Harvard law professor
Adrian Vermeule in A New ConstitutionalOrder? The Emergency Constitution
in the Post-September II World Order,75 FORDHAM L. REV. 631 (2006).
155 Recent articles on the topic include: Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of
Duty: Compelling Health Care Professionals to Work During an Influenza
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But two cases arguably support the position that the
government could order healthcare workers to pitch-in and help.
156
One such case, In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig.,
noted that the government is required to act, enlisting persons,
firms and corporations in the private sector to eliminate the threat
to society. 157

The second case vacated as premature an injunction against
enforcement of a state law that imposed a criminal penalty for
refusing to assist a police officer or firefighter when
commanded. 58 There, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that
"the government can, in certain circumstances, compel individuals
to risk their physical safety" by complying with police/fireassistance laws, citing a number of instances where such laws have
been upheld, apparently even though private citizens received no
compensation. 159
Presumably an executive order or agency regulation
directing physicians and other health workers to serve would have

Pandemic, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2008) (arguing that health care providers should
not be compelled to serve in times of emergency since there is no legal or ethical
mandate to serve); David Buchanan, Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice:
EthicalPrioritiesin Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 15 (2008); Ariel R.
Schwartz, Doubtful Duty: Physicians' Legal Obligation to Treat During an
Epidemic, 60 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2007). Other articles touching on aspects of
this include James G. Hodge et al., The Legal Frameworkfor Meeting Surge
Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Professionals During Public Health
Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 Contemp. Health Law & Pol'y 5 (Fall
2005); Douglas B. White, M.D. et al., Who Should Receive Life SupportDuring
Public Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principles to Improve Allocation
Decisions, 150 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 132 (2009).
156 In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 456 F.Supp.2d 520, 550 (S.D.
N.Y. 2006).
157 Id. at 550 (stating that "pursuant to the common law ... when an emergent
disaster threatens society as a whole, the doctrine of salus populi supreme lex
(the welfare of the people is the highest law) requires the government to act,
enlisting persons, firms and corporations in the private sector to eliminate the
threat to society and restore society's ability to function.")
158 State v. Floyd, 584 A.2d 1157 (1991).
59

Id.

at 1164.
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the force of law justifying that action and could create "new160 law"
or "new duties" that go beyond the letter of an enabling law.
B. Sharing of Medical Information Among
Government Authorities
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

("HIPPA")

contains

exceptions

allowing

for

data-sharing,

including public health and terrorism emergencies. The Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act provides similar power to
16
States. 1
C. Liability of Vaccine Manufacturers
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act
(PREPA), enacted in 2005, provides immunity from liability to

manufacturers, distributors, and other parties whose products are
used to counter a pandemic or epidemic, once the Secretary of
HHS declares an emergency.162
PREPA also creates an exclusive compensation program
for vaccine victims. Some have questioned the adequacy of
Congress' level of funding of the PREPA compensation program,

160

See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979); Sorenson

Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating
that agency regulation "has the force of law, and creates new law or imposes
new rights or duties"); Delgadillo v. Astrue, 601 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1248 (D.
Colo. 2007) (asserting that "executive orders bind the agencies" and "have the
force of law in the same way as legislative rules") (quoting 32 Wright & Koch, §
8277). Administrative guidance or advisories do not have the force of law but
can be used in enforcement actions and private suits for failure to adhere to
medical or industry standards, when licensed or regulated entities ignore them.
First Nat'l Bank of LaMarque v. Smith, 610 F.2d 1258, 1263-65 (5th Cir. 1980)
(discussing regulatory advisory letter to national banks).
161 See Corrine Parver, Lessons from Disaster:HIPPA, Medicaid, and Privacy
Issues The Nation's Response to HurricaneKatrina, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 651,
654-57 (2006).
162 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d & 247d-6e; see also FederalImmunity Enactedfor
Manufacturers of Avian Flu Vaccine and Other Biodefense Products, 203
PRODUCTS LIAB. ADVISORY 5 (2006).

2011-2012

MandatoryImmunization

arguing that once the government provides
exclusive remedies, it
163
has a duty to provide adequate relief.
Determining which virus strains should be included in a
vaccine is said to be an "educated guess." 164 U.S. and European
officials reportedly might approve vaccines on a "fast track" basis
before clinical trials are completed, and future immunization
programs could be set-back for decades if a vaccine were found to
be harmful. Opinions are divided over fast-track vaccine plans, and
several experts say that if things
go wrong, there could be lasting
165
implications for public health.

D. Effect of Government Directives on Civil
Liability Among Private Parties
An emergency and the preparation leading up to it can
involve the government directing private firms to produce or
deliver needed items and services, which can result in a firm's
breaching its pre-existing contracts with other private parties. In

163

B. Kurt Copper, "High and Dry?" The Public Readiness and Emergency

PreparednessAct and Liability Protectionfor PharmaceuticalManufacturers,
40 J. HEALTH LAW 65, 92-104 (2007) (noting unsettled state of tort law);
Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal
Government's LackadaisicalLiability and CompensationPolicies in the Context
of Pre-Event Vaccine Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE LAW & POL'Y
7 (2005).
164 N. Pieter M. O'Leary, Combating Nature's Insurgency: Tamiflu
and
Vaccination in the Fight Against Avian Influenza, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED &
LAW 469, 474-76 (2006).
165See N. Henrich & B. Holmes, The Public's Acceptance of Novel Vaccines
During a Pandemic: A Focus Group Study and its Application to Influenza

H1N1

EMERGING

HEALTH

THREATS

JOURNAL,

http://www.eht-

journal.net/index.php/ehtj/article/view/7088. More information on the National
Vaccine
Injury
Compensation
Program
may be
found at http:/
/www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Vaccine Litigation in the Torts
Branch's Office of Constitutional and Specialized Torts handles litigation in this
area. Suits may be filed only with the U.S. Supreme Court of Federal Claims.
Information on the Department of Justice's Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (VICP) is available at http://www'justice.gov/civil/common/vicp.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
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general, government directives immunize private firms from
liability.166
These principles should cover any intervening government
directive issued to vaccine manufacturers. Meanwhile, vaccine
manufacturers would likely continue to process "regular" annual
flu vaccines despite any developing pandemic. 167
E. "Takings," Just Compensation & PriceControls
The destruction or taking of private property and imposing

price-controls during emergencies involves
government's police
16 8
power and do not subject it to liability.
166

See Organizacion JD LTDA vs. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir.

1993) ("[P]rivate ... banks cannot be subject to a damages action because the
intervening

government actions

.

.

.

rendered any enforceable

contract

impossible to perform."), cert. den., 512 U.S. 1207 (1994); Eastern Air Lines.,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 996-98 (5th Cir. 1976)
(upholding agency's order that the entire output of a factory must be devoted to
government production); Centex, Inc. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952, 954-56 (Tex.
1992) (enforcing regulatory agency order prohibiting contract performance by
regulated party excusing non-performance). The defense of legal impossibility
includes "'commercial impracticability,' which exists where performance can be
undertaken only at an excessive and unreasonable cost"-situations often arising
during emergencies. Davies Precision Machining, Inc., v. United States, 35 Fed.
Cl. 651, 670 (1996)). Conflicting federal-state mandates exempt a party from
complying with state requirements. See, e.g., Spring Spectrum L.P. v. Mills, 283
F.3d 404, 414-15 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. Supreme Court).
167 See N Henrich & B Holmes, supra,note 166.
168 United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952) (discussing the
principle in both war-time and peace-time contexts); Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S.
272, 278-80 (1928) (allowing for the destruction of red cedar trees on private
property in order to halt the spread of tree disease). See also Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("[Health and safety
regulations are] the type of regulation[s] in which the private interest has
traditionally been most confined and governments are given the greatest leeway
to act without the need to compensate ...

."

(holding that, while the regulation

did not necessarily preclude a taking, there was no taking here, where the
government caused the loss of egg-laying hens due to testing positive for
salmonella); Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76 (2005) (discussing a range
of eminent domain issues at length). See generally D. Benjamin Barros, The
Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIMIi L. REv. 471 (2004);

2011-2012

MandatoryImmunization

According to one group of commentators: "What are the
regulatory repercussions of a government action to address an
emergency public health threat? In particular, when, if ever, might
such an action be held to constitute a 'taking' of property ...and
therefore require compensation?
The answer is seldom, but the law
69
clear."'
from
if far
Clear or not, traditional eminent domain case law has held
that owners whose property has been destroyed pursuant to the
government's emergency police power are not entitled to
compensation. The classic case involved the City of Boston's
destruction of entire homes in the path of a fast-moving fire, to
contain a conflagration.' 70 The proposition was summed up in
AmeriSource Corporation v. United States:I7 1 "[P]roperty taken
not to secure a public benefit but rather to prevent public harm is
172
not compensable under the Fifth Amendment."
Bowditch also noted British and American case law that
stated emergencies could justifiably permit the "destruction of life
itself' in extreme cases, and that "[tihe rights of necessity are a
part of the law ... [because] the common law adopts the principle
of the natural law, and173finds the right and justification in the same
imperative necessity."
Gregory R. Kirsch, Note, Takings andPrice Controls in Emergencies, 79 VA. L.

REv. 1235 (1993) (describing takings compensation in the case of pricecontrols).

169 Robert A. Malson et al., Private Property in Public Health Emergencies, 32
J. L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 79, 81 (2004) (part of the proceedings
from the Third Annual Partnership Conference on Public Health Law).
170Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 16 (1879).
171
75 Fed. Cl. 743 (2007).
172
Id.at 747(citing Seay v. United States, 61. Fed. Cl. 32, 35 (2004)).
171101 U.S. at 18-19 (quoting Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 357, 362

(1788)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). References to the "destruction of
life" pursuant to government exercise of its police-power in emergencies

(perhaps when vaccine causes death) may be found in Caltex (Philippines), Inc.
v. United States, 100 F.Supp. 970, 978 (Ct.CI. 1951) (citing older Supreme

Court case that in turn cites additional cases) and Louisa County v. Yancey's
Trustees, 63 S.E. 452, 455 (1909) (citing Iowa and Georgia cases). "There is an
implied assent on the part of every member of society that his own individual
welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his
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CONCLUSION

The law of emergencies, especially public health
emergencies, is a difficult area of the law, one that intersects with a
number of areas of the law and that is fraught with hardship and
much emotion.
The current "law of emergencies" can probably be summed
up as follows:
[Pre-disaster] [s]tatutory and regulatory reform on their
own do not ensure a functioning, sound legal environment
during emergencies. This is due, in part, to a fundamental
premise underlying most emergency laws: during declared
emergencies, the legal landscape [often] changes instantly
and drastically. With this changing landscape comes
significant, though temporary, legal challenges that require
affirmative [ongoing] responses [and adjustments] to
effectuate public health efforts .... These and other efforts

are not limited to single point in time. Rather, they must be
accomplished throughout the duration of a public health
emergency . .

.

. There is a consistent need to balance

individual and communal needs and make trade-offs that
are legally and ethically reasonable. Amidst chaos,
constitutional norms may be stretched to facilitate
emergency responses . .

.

. In reality, there is no pre-

existing legal script for how to address these and other
public health challenges and emergencies principally
because the emergency itselfdefies systematic resolution of
legal issues.174
property, liberty, and life shall under certain circumstances, be placed in
jeopardy or even sacrificedfor thepublic good." State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459, 46061 (1900) (quoting HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS,
CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED 4 (4 th Ed. 1854)) (emphasis added). See also
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power.").
174

Hodge, supranote 145, at 629-32 (emphasis added).

MandatoryImmunization

2011-2012

As the court stated in In Re World Trade Center Disaster Site
Litig.:"'
The City and State agencies acted also pursuant to the
common law, for when an emergent disaster threatens
society as a whole, the doctrine ofsaluspopuli supreme lex
(the welfare of the people is the highest law) requires the
government to act, enlisting persons, firms and
corporationsin the private sector to eliminate the threatto
society and restore society's ability to function. Salus
populi means 'that society has a right that corresponds to
the right of self-preservation in the individual, and it rests
upon necessity because there can be no effective
government without it.' Salus Populi and [State law]
coincide,6 for both encourage immediate action to preserve
society

171In
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Re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F.Supp.2d at 550 (quoting

Daly v. Port Auth., 793 N.Y.S.2d 712, 718 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
176"Immediate state action" does not mean that the danger must be imminent.
As government officials scan the globe and "see it coming," they should be able
to move forward with a program that might not culminate for weeks, months, or
even longer including "early" vaccinations that can require time to provide
immunization. Given the nature of modem-era natural and "designer"
catastrophes, lead-time and processing is essential, presenting a classic case of
adapting traditional legal principles to the needs of today's society and world. In
re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F.Supp.2d
348, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ([Courts] expand the common law to accommodate
the changing needs of society."); Caesars Riverboat Casino, L.L.C. v. Kephart,
903 N.E.2d 117, 130-31 (Ind.App. 2009) ("[T]he strengths and genius of the
common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the society it
governs.") (quoting Brooks v. Robinson, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ind. 1972)).
Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1313 (Vt. 1986) (Gibson, J., dissenting) ("The
judiciary must take cognizance of the vitality of the common law; as the needs
of a society evolve, we are obligated 'to face a difficult legal question and
accept judicial responsibility for a needed change in the common law.')
(quoting Hay v. Med. Ctr. Hosp., 492 A.2d 939, 945 (Vt. 1985)).
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Boiled down even further, the modern "law of
emergencies" seems to be encapsulated by the point made by Chief
Justice Rehnquist: When major emergencies strike,
the "law of
77
necessity" is the one rule that trumps all the others.'

177 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN

(1998) (describing the historical need to curtail civil liberties in times
of emergency).
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